plan-ceo-review
“CEO/founder-mode plan review. (gstack)”
aipkg.jsonLICENSE.txtREADME.mdSKILL.mdSKILL.md.tmpl- 01SDI-275%HIGH
SKILL.md:8
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The skill spawns complex external subagents and agents (via Agent tool and codex exec commands) without declaring this capability in the manifest. This creates an unclear trust boundary: users don't know that their input and context are being sent to additional AI systems or external tools. If any of these subagents are compromised or if the communication channels are not encrypted, sensitive information could be leaked.
06description: CEO/founder-mode plan review. (gstack)07benefits-from: [office-hours]08allowed-tools:09 - Read10 - Grepfix 1. Explicitly declare in the manifest: 'capabilities: [spawn-subagents, call-external-tools, codex-integration]'. 2. Add a prominent warning in the skill description about data being sent to subagents. 3. Implement explicit user consent before spawning subagents with sensitive data. 4. Document exactly which systems receive which data (e.g., 'plan content sent to Codex for adversarial review').
- 02SDI-380%MEDIUM
SKILL.md:8
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The preamble modifies ~/.gstack/ directory structure and writes analytics/review logs, but the manifest declares no such permissions. This means users are unaware that the skill is persisting data about their work, sessions, and review activity. Additionally, if ~/.gstack/ is world-writable or on a shared system, this creates a race condition or privilege escalation vector where other users could inject malicious content into the analytics files.
06description: CEO/founder-mode plan review. (gstack)07benefits-from: [office-hours]08allowed-tools:09 - Read10 - Grepfix 1. Add explicit declaration to manifest: 'permissions: [read-write-home-gstack, write-analytics, write-sessions]'. 2. Ensure ~/.gstack/ directories are created with restrictive permissions (mode 0700). 3. Sanitize all data written to analytics files to prevent injection attacks. 4. Inform users in the skill description that session and analytics data are recorded.
- 03SDI-275%MEDIUM
SKILL.md:8
detailhide
The skill spawns complex external subagents and agents (via Agent tool and codex exec commands) without declaring this capability in the manifest. This creates an unclear trust boundary: users don't know that their input and context are being sent to additional AI systems or external tools. If any of these subagents are compromised or if the communication channels are not encrypted, sensitive information could be leaked.
06description: CEO/founder-mode plan review. (gstack)07benefits-from: [office-hours]08allowed-tools:09 - Read10 - Grepfix 1. Explicitly declare in the manifest: 'capabilities: [spawn-subagents, call-external-tools, codex-integration]'. 2. Add a prominent warning in the skill description about data being sent to subagents. 3. Implement explicit user consent before spawning subagents with sensitive data. 4. Document exactly which systems receive which data (e.g., 'plan content sent to Codex for adversarial review').
- 04SDI-470%MEDIUM
SKILL.md:1821
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The skill is documented as 'review-only' in comments, but the code actively writes plan files, modifies project state (updates CEO plans, writes to TODOS.md, creates directories), and persists decisions. This misrepresentation could lead users to believe the skill is read-only when it actually mutates their project. If a user believes no changes will be made, they may run it in an unsafe context or with untrusted input.
1819- Effort uses the AI-compression table from CLAUDE.md.18201821### JSONL artifact (always write, even if zero tasks)18221823`/autoplan` reads this file to aggregate across phases. Build each line withfix 1. Remove 'review-only' language from comments and replace with accurate description of mutations. 2. Add explicit warnings before any write operation via AskUserQuestion. 3. Provide a --dry-run mode or clear log of what will be written before writing. 4. Update the manifest to clearly state this skill writes to project files.
- 05SSD-375%MEDIUM
SKILL.md.tmpl:801
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The skill calls `gstack-review-log` to persist review metadata to `~/.gstack/` with explicit instruction that 'The skill preamble already writes to ~/.gstack/sessions/ and ~/.gstack/analytics/' and 'The review dashboard depends on this data.' This creates implicit persistent logging of all review sessions without explicit user consent at execution time. Users running this skill may not realize their review metadata is being logged to disk for later analysis via a 'review dashboard.'
799command breaks the review readiness dashboard in /ship.800801```bash802~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-review-log '{"skill":"plan-ceo-review","timestamp":"TIMESTAMP","status":"STATUS","unresolved":N,"critical_gaps":N,"mode":"MODE","scope_proposed":N,"scope_accepted":N,"scope_deferred":N,"commit":"COMMIT"}'803```fix Add explicit notification before running gstack-review-log: 'This review will be logged to ~/.gstack/projects/{SLUG}/reviews/ for dashboard analysis. Review data includes: mode selected, issues found, timestamps, and commit hash. [Continue] [Disable logging]'